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Doe Dancer I v. La Fuente, Inc., Nev. Adv. Op. 3 (Feb. 25, 2021)1 
 
INTERPRETING THE TERM “EMPLOYEE” PURSUANT TO NEVADA’S MINIMUM 




The definition of the term “employee” in Article 15, Section 16 of the Nevada 
Constitution, the Minimum Wage Amendment, (MWA) incorporates the economic realities test 
of the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA). Moreover, NRS.608.0155’s expansion definition of the 




 Each appellant (Doe Dancers), at some point, performed as a dancer at Cheetahs Lounge, 
owned by respondent La Fuente, Inc. (Cheetahs). The Doe Dancers were permitted to perform at 
Cheetah’s as long as they had a sheriff’s card, state ID, work licenses, and costume, were not 
“trashed” and were “standing up.” However, after receiving a performing shift, the Doe Dancers 
were required to comply with a long list of posted rules that were strictly enforced by Cheetahs.  
The long list of rules addressed the Doe Dancers’ manners, etiquette, social interactions, 
personal hygiene, wound care, transportation and parking. The rules also included similar rules 
that would be enforced in a typical workplace, such as rules regarding the use of the shared 
refrigerator as well as rules prohibiting smoking, chewing gum, or using one’s personal phone 
while performing. Cheetahs’ rules further digressed to intrusive limitations including, but not 
limited to, informing the manager of current prescription medications, prohibiting the use of 
glass and plastic cups in dressing rooms, requiring an intoxication test before each shift, and 
requiring a minimum of three costume changes during each shift. The evidence showed that 
these rules were strictly enforced. In addition to the posted rules, the Doe Dancers were 
prohibited from dancing based on less tangible standards such as having a “bad attitude,” being 
“total ghetto,” or acting like a “prima donna.”  
Before each shift, the Doe Dancers were required to a sign a “Dancer Performer’s Lease” 
agreement which disavowed any employment relationship. Additionally, the leasing agreement 
gave Cheetahs the right to impose rules upon the Doe Dancers with absolute discretion. Despite 
this contractual agreement, the Doe Dancers demanded minimum wage from Cheetahs claiming 
they were employees. Cheetahs refused, considering the Doe Dancers to be independent 
contractors.  
As a result, the Doe Dancers filed a class action against Cheetahs in which both parties 
filed cross motions for summary judgment. Doe Dancers sought a ruling that they were entitled 
to minimum wages under both NRS Chapter 608 and Article 15, Section 16 of the Nevada 
Constitution, the Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA).2 Cheetahs sought a ruling that the Doe 
Dancers were not entitled to minimum wages because they were conclusively presumed to be 
independent contractors pursuant to NRS 608.0155. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Cheetahs finding that the Doe Dancers were independent contractors under 
both NRS Chapter 608 and MWA, and thus were ineligible to receive to minimum wages. The 
 
1  By Kristin Wilde. 
2  NEV. CONST. art. 15, § 16. 
Doe Dancers appealed, abandoning their claims under NRS Chapter 806, solely relying on 




 The Court reviewed the district court’s classification of the Doe Dancers as independent 
contractors de novo. The Court held that to determine whether the Doe Dancers were correctly 
classified as independent contractors was a question of statutory interpretation and the 
constitutional reach of MWA.  
In examining the statutory meaning of the MWA, the Court found that the term 
“employee” was ambiguous on its face. The MWA text alone did not provide meaningful 
clarification to the term “employee”. As such, the Court turned to external aids of interpretation. 
The Court found that federal case law interpreting the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA)3 provided 
interpretation guidance, reasoning that Nevada Courts look to analogous federal counterparts 
when interpreting state provisions. Additionally, the Court further reasoned that the FLSA should 
serve as an interpretation aid, because the Nevada Legislature has long recognized that federal 
minimum wage laws provide a floor for workers’ protection in the state. 
 The Court found that because MWA’s definition of employee mirrored FLSA’s 
definition for employee, it can presume that the Nevada Legislature enacted MWA with full 
knowledge of FLSA. Thus, the Court concluded that the federal economic realities test found 
within FLSA applied in determining MWA’s definition of employee.  
 The economic realities test of the FLSA consists of six prongs that must be sufficiently 
met. While the Court noted that the FLSA’s definition of employee applied to exotic dancers 
in the similar case Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club,4 the Court held that exotic dancers 
do not make up a class that categorically receives the status of employee. Rather, the 
economic realities test must be applied to the particular facts in each specific case. Here, the 
court easily determined that each prong of the economic realities test was sufficiently met, 
lending to support that the Doe Dancers should be considered employees. 
 Next, the Court examined whether NRS 608.0155’s definition of independent 
contractor excluded the Doe Dancers from the constitutional protection of the MWA. While 
Cheetahs contend that NRS 608.0155’s expanded definition of independent contractor does 
not conflict with MWA’s definition of employee, the Court noted that independent contractor 
and employee are mutually exclusive concepts and thus, the two could not be read to be in 
harmony. However, the Court held that the Nevada Legislature intended the two laws to be 
read harmoniously, thus limiting the NRS 608.0155 definition of independent contractors to 
only apply to NRS Chapter 608 claims. Here, the Doe Dancers were only claiming protection 
under MWA. Additionally, the Court held that even if NRS.608.0155 was intended to apply 
to additional claims besides NRS Chapter 608 claims, it could not alter the protection of the 
MWA as this would raise a separation of powers issue. The Nevada Legislature cannot create 





3  Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1938). 
4  Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club, 336 P.3d 951 (2014). 
Conclusion 
The Court concluded that MWA’s definition of employee incorporates the economic 
realities test of the FLSA. Additionally, the Court held that NRS.608.0155 did not exclude 
the Doe Dancers from their rights under MWA. Here, because the Doe Dancers were 
considered employees under MWA, and NRS 608.0155 could not impose any limitation on 
this determination, the Doe Dancers were found to be entitled to receive minimum wages. 
The Court reversed the district court’s order of summary judgment in favor of Cheetahs and 
remanded for a proceeding consistent with this opinion.  
  
Concurrence 
Justice Stiglich issued a concurring opinion stating that she agreed with the majority 
opinion that that the MWA incorporates the economic realities test of the FLSA, and that the test 
was successfully met here. However, she differed, finding that the NRS 608.0155 indeed was 
intended to limit the protection scope of the MWA. Justice Stiglich concluded that because the 
Nevada Legislature did not have the power to do so, her diverting analysis would still produce 
the same result as the majority opinion.   
  
 
